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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal regimes regulating the exploitation of atomic energy follow
three patterns. The pattern adopted in a particular country de-
pends upon its social and governmental structure. In socialist
states, like the Soviet Union, the state owns and uses nuclear
materials and installations and is a monopolistic insurer against
atomic hazards. In such states nuclear energy law is simplicity
itself. It consists of instructions and regulations on the handling,
transport and storage of nuclear materials, and the management
of nuclear installations by administrative agencies. An important
part of the regulations deals with the safety and health of the
workers.
Countries in which government monopolies (including a monop-
oly over nuclear materials) coexist with private enterprise present
a more complicated situation. In those countries private law still
constitutes the foundation for legal order and economic activity.
Publicly owned enterprises are under the same tort and contract
regime as private business. Transport, storage, and safety laws,
and special medical and sanitary supervision of nuclear materials
work sites are quite similar to the socialist regime.
Finally, when the government does not have a nuclear material
monopoly, controls are designed solely to prevent public or em-
ployee exposure to the dangers of radiation or atomic disaster.
Property, contract, and tort concepts retain their full force and
importance and are properly adjusted to meet the special dangers
posed by nuclear materials.
The differences between these three regimes are clearest under
private law. Presently, the nuclear laws of the United States and
West Germany are in a process of final liberalization. French law,
however, represents an intermediate position because of the virtual
government monopoly on the exploitation of nuclear fuels.
I. THE SoviET NUCLEAR REGIME
One notable feature of Soviet nuclear law is the absence of insur-
ance against tort liability for citizens or industrial installations.
Also lacking is any special legislation regulating tort liability in
connection with the use of nuclear materials. Under the general
rules of civil law, Soviet enterprises using nuclear fuel or producing
nuclear materials are liable for damage done to others. According
to the tort provisions of the new Civil Code of the Soviet Union,
absence of fault on the part of the tortfeasor is a good defense.
Harm caused to the person or property of a citizen or an organiza-
tion (e.g., collective farm) must be compensated in full by the
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tortfeasor. Liability for harm caused by a lawful act is imposed
only in statutorily enumerated situations. According to section
454 of the Civil Code:
Organizations and citizens whose activities involve increased danger
for their neighbours (transport organizations, industrial enterprises,
builders, motorists, etc.) are bound to make good any harm caused
by such source of increased danger, unless, they can prove that the
harm was due to irresistible force or was caused intentionally by the
victim.
Special provisions deal with health and sanitation in nuclear
installations and the transport of nuclear materials. The first legis-
lative act dealing with work conditions in the handling of nuclear
materials was issued in 1953.1 It was followed by a similar set of
rules issued by the Chief State Sanitation Inspector of the USSR
on January 14, 1957.2 These regulations dealt with work safety,
medical examination of personnel employed in nuclear installa-
tions, and diagnosis of professional diseases related to this type of
employment.3 "Regulations concerning the transporting of nuclear
materials" were promulgated in 1960.1
III. WESTERN APPROACHES TO AToMIc ENERGY LAW
While Soviet legislation suggests that dangers connected with
the use of the atom are adequately dealt with by the general prop-
erty and tort concepts, in nonsocialist countries the growing im-
portance of peaceful uses of atomic energy has produced the great-
est challenges in property and tort law since the Industrial Revolu-
tion. Initially, each nation had to decide whether public or private
institutions would develop nonmilitary atomic energy. The resolu-
tion of this question determined the outcome of the two principal
1. USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, SANITARY REGULATIONS AND NORMS IN REGARD
TO WORK WITH RADIOACTIVE ISOTOPES (1954).
2. ATOMIZDAT, SANITARY REGULATIONS REGARDING THE TRANSPORTATION, STOR-
AGE, ACCOUNTING FOR, AND WORK WITH RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES (1958).
3. Cf. PROFIZDAT, TEXT OF PROFESSIONAL AILMENTS, SUPPLEMENT 3 k.p. 63
DECREE WITH REGARD TO THE ORDER OF ASSIGNMENT AND PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION
FROM THE STATE INSURANCE ORGANIZATION (1962). See also, Barry, The Motor-car
in Soviet Criminal and Civil Law, 16 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 56, 73 (1969); Gray,
Soviet Tort Law: The New Principles Annotated, in LAW IN SOVIET SOCIETY 80,
97 (W. Lafave ed. 1965); HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW 381-416 (1963);
Grzybowski, Soviet Socialism and the Function of Equity, in EQUITY IN THE
WORLD LEGAL SYSTEMS 385-437 (R. Newman ed. 1973).
4. ATOMIZDAT, REGULATIONS REGARDING TRANSFER OF RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES,
No. 349-60 (1961).
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issues of atomic energy law-ownership and liability. Permissible
limits to private ownership of nuclear materials, facilities, and
technology had to be defined. Property law was affected because
any individual rights in nuclear property were now subject to mod-
ification by special nuclear legislation. Additionally, atomic en-
ergy development involved new risks unlike those normally cov-
ered by tort law. For example, if a nuclear accident were to occur,
the damages sustained could considerably exceed any previous tort
recovery arising out of a single accident.5 Nuclear liability was thus
considered unique and was given special legislative treatment.'
France, Germany, and the United States all have special nuclear
legislation modifying their property and tort laws. Both the United
States and Germany significantly amended their nuclear legisla-
tion in 1975. France, which has not recently made any major
changes in its nuclear legislation, is a member of the European
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and has faithfully im-
plemented the principles of the Paris and Brussels Supplementary
Conventions. These conventions have significantly added to the
nuclear law in free societies. Following the end of World War II,
5. In 1957, the "Brookhaven Report" estimated that a major nuclear reactor
accident might cause as much as $7 billion in damages, kill up to 3,400 persons
and injure 43,000 others. See H.R. REP. No. 435, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1957)
(letter of Harold S. Vance, Acting Chairman of the AEC).
The 1974 Rasmussen Report estimated that:
The most likely core melt accident, having a likelihood of one in 17,000 per
plant per year, would cause property damage of about $100,000 .... The
chance of an accident causing $100 million damage would be about one in
50,000 per year .... The probability would be about one in one million per
plant per year of causing damage of about $2-3 billion. The maximum value
would be predicted to be about $4-6 billion with a probability of about one
in 1,000,000,000 per plant per year.
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Acci-
dent Risks in U.S. Commerical Nuclear Power Plants, 16 ATOM. ENERGY L.J. 177,
198-99 (1974).
Besides the possibility of an astronomical amount of damages, nuclear acci-
dents may pose novel legal problems in the proof of actual causation and even
personal injury itself. For a discussion of how these problems of proof might affect
the plaintiff in a nuclear accident case, see Note, Nuclear Liability Legislation
in the United States and Europe, 13 STAN. L. Rav. 865 (1961).
6. Nuclear liability is defined as the legal consequence of personal injury or
property damage resulting from a nuclear accident. Nuclear accident, termed
"nuclear incident" in the United States Atomic Energy Act, means "any occur-
rence ... causing . . . bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of use of
property, arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other
hazardous properties of source, special nuclear material, or by-product material."
42 U.S.C. § 2014(q) (1970).
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both the United States and France created administrative bodies
to study and research possible peaceful uses of atomic energy and
the social and legal ramifications of such use.7 Germany's devel-
opment of a legal regime for the peaceful use of nuclear energy was
delayed by post-war occupation until the creation of the Federal
German Republic (1949) within the organizational framework of
the European Communities.'
The remarkable feature of the evolution of nuclear laws in the
three countries under discussion is that each country was able to
develop a regime corresponding to its general social philosophy
using a different approach and legal technique. The United States,
after an early initiative to adopt a global solution (the Baruch
Plan), resorted to national legislation. France and Germany com-
bined international (EURATOM) with national legislation, each
arriving at different technical solutions in accordance with their
ideas on the role of free enterprise in the management of nuclear
installations and the exploitaton of nuclear materials.
IV. HISTORY OF AMERICAN, FRENCH, GERMAN, AND EURATOM
NUCLEAR LEGISLATION
A. France (1945-1946)
The Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique (CEA) was established
in France by the Ordinance of October 18, 1945,1 as a government
organization, to engage in "pure" research and find practical ap-
plications for atomic energy. By creating Electricit6 de France
(EDF), a public utility corporation, the nationalization law of
April 8, 1946, provided for a government monopoly over the use of
nuclear energy for the production of electricity.'0 These laws estab-
lishing the administrative framework for civilian atomic energy
were the only nuclear legislation in France at that time.
B. United States (1946-1957)
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (McMahon Act) created a gov-
ernment monopoly over nuclear materials, facilities, and technol-
7. England and the USSR also began an atomic energy program at that time.
Labb6, Rapports entre le secteur public et le secteur privo dans le domaine du
droit de l'6nergie atomique, in 2 ASPECTS DU DRorr DE L'NERGIE ATOMIQUE 75, 78
(C.H. Puget ed. 1967).
8. Amtsblatt der Hohen Kommission 122, 882, 1361 (1950).
9. Ordonnance 45-2563 of 18 Oct. 1945, [1945] J.O. 7065, 7206.
10. Loi No. 46,628 of 8 avr. 1946, [1946] J.O. 2951.
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ogy by transferring control over American nuclear power from the
military to the newly created Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).I
This government monopoly over atomic energy was later partially
abandoned by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which revised and
superseded the 1946 Act. 2 Statutory prohibitions against private
manufacture, ownership, and operation of nuclear facilities were
removed, but absolute restrictions against the private ownership
of special nuclear material were still maintained, necessitating
leasing of nuclear fuel from the Government.
Despite the 1954 authorization of private participation, business
was reluctant to invest in the fledgling private nuclear industry
because of certain cost disincentives, particularly unlimited liabil-
ity for accidents. 3 After unsuccessfully trying various types of fed-
eral economic incentives and subsidies to spur the development of
the private atomic energy industry, 14 the Price-Anderson Act of
195711 was enacted. The United States thereby became the first
nation in the world to introduce nuclear liability legislation.
11. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (1946).
12. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281 (1970)). Both international and domestic pressure accounted
for the partial dissolution of the American government monopoly in atomic en-
ergy. By 1954, it was apparent that the secrets of atomic energy were no longer
known only to the U.S. Fear of competition from other nations created a public
demand that private industry be allowed to assist the United States Government
in the international race for atomic energy development. There were cries to
remove the "island of socialism" from the free enterprise system. Perhaps most
significantly, however, Atomic Energy Commission research and development
had finally expanded atomic energy technology to the stage at which civilian
nuclear power seemed to have a real, and ultimately profitable, future. See Green,
Nuclear Power: Risk, Liability and Indemnity, 71 MICH. L. REv. 479, 480 (1973).
13. The unlimited liability problem was aggravated by the inadequacy of the
private third-party liability insurance available for nuclear accidents.
Governmental Indemnity for Private Licensees and AEC Contractors Against
Reactor Hazards: Hearings on H.R. 9701, S. 3929 Before the Joint Comm. on
Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1956).
14. Morrison, Federal Support of Domestic Atomic Power Development-The
Policy Issues, 12 VAND. L. REV. 195, 196-218 (1958).
15. Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1970). Under United States legisla-
tion, nuclear liability was limited to a ceiling amount of damages that could be
recovered in one nuclear incident. Id. § 2210(e). Operators of nuclear installations
were required to maintain compulsory financial security covering all persons who
might be liable for a nuclear accident. Id. § 2210(b). Finally, the legislation
required the United States Government to indemnify any person held liable in a
nuclear accident for any amount of his limited liability that private insurance
would not cover. Id. § 2210(c).
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C. EURATOM (1958)
While the United States sought a national solution to nuclear
energy problems, on January 1, 1958, the EURATOM Treaty was
enacted. The six member nations, including France and Germany,
thereby created a supranational institution to deal with European
civilian atomic energy development. 6 The EURATOM Treaty
made the Community the "legal owner" of all special nuclear ma-
terial produced in the six member nations." Ownership by EURA-
TOM, however, left the possessor of the special nuclear material
with full rights to use and consume the material-a type of
"economic ownership" right.'" The EURATOM Community was
also given an enforceable option to contract for all source material
in the member nations.19
D. Germany (1959)
In 1959, two years after the enactment of the Price-Anderson
Act in the United States, Germany passed its first Atomic Energy
Law (Atomgesetz), 20 which limited the government's role to neces-
sary health, safety, and security protection.2' Unlike France and
the United States, Germany did not establish a central govern-
mental body responsible for atomic energy research or regulation.
The bulk of the administrative tasks were given to the state
(Ldnder) authorities who had administered previously existing
atomic energy regulations.2 An advisory committee named the
Deutsche Atom Kommission (DAK) was to be the only federal
16. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, 298
U.N.T.S. 169 (1958) [hereinafter cited as EURATOM Treaty]. The other four
member nations were Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. EURA-
TOM was to deal with foreign policy, research, public health and safety, in-
dustrial development, and supplies of materials for the EURATOM Community.
Gaudet, EURA TOM in 1 LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 140, 163 (H. Marks ed. 1959).
17. EURATOM Treaty, supra note 16, art. 86.
18. Id. art. 87. Of course, the "economic ownership" right was subject to all
treaty obligations in regard to safety control, the right of option for possession,
and health protection.
19. Id. art. 52. EURATOM had ultimate legal control over all nuclear sub-
stances-both special nuclear materials and source material. There could no
longer be any "legal ownership" of special nuclear material by private parties, or
indeed by individual member nations, within the EURATOM Community.
20. Act of Dec. 12, 1959, [1959] BGB1 1 813.
21. H. KRusE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE PEACEFUL UTILIZATION OF AToMIc ENERGY
15 (1962).
22. Act of Dec. 12, 1959, § 24, [1959] BGB1 1 813.
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body concerned with atomic energy.2 Although the 1959 Atom-
gesetz created a more orderly system of atomic energy adminis-
tration, it did not significantly affect the property law of Germany.
The Atomgesetz did, however, make important contributions to
German liability laws.24
E. The Paris and Brussels Supplementary
Conventions (1960 and 1963)
Sixteen European nations, including France and Germany,
signed the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of
Nuclear Energy (The Paris Convention)2 on July 29, 1960. For the
first time, an international agreement defined major principles of
nuclear liability governing an entire group of countries."6 The pro-
tection accorded by the Paris Convention was amplified in January
1963, when the Brussels Supplementary Convention2 was signed
by thirteen of the signatories to the Paris Convention. Under the
Supplementary Convention, additional compensation, up to a
total of $120 million, was made available through individual and
collective state intervention. Implementation of these unique in-
ternational principles of the Paris and Brussels Supplementary
23. Resolution of Cabinet of Dec. 21, 1955, [1955] BGB1 II 242.
24. A ceiling was imposed on potential liability arising from a nuclear acci-
dent. Act of Dec. 12, 1959, § 38, [1959] BGB1 1 813. Strict liability, without any
provision for a force majeure exception, was established for operators of nuclear
installatons. Id. § 25. Other persons who might be found liable for a nuclear
accident, such as suppliers, were subjected to a negligence standard. Id. § 26. The
operator was also required to maintain a financial reserve to protect himself and
all other persons who could be found liable for a nuclear accident involving his
nuclear facilities or material. Id. § 15. Finally, the German federal government
agreed to indemnify private industry for any limited liability that could not be
covered by private insurance. Id. § 36.
25. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July
29, 1960, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 1082 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Paris Convention].
26. These principles were: (1) absolute and exclusive liability of the operator
of a nuclear installation (id. art. 3); (2) limitation of liability in time (id. art. 8);
(3) limitation of liability in amount (id. art. 7); (4) compulsory financial security
to cover the liability of the operator (id. art. 10); and (5) one court-that of the
place where the incident occurs-competent for all claims arising out of the same
accident, with obligatory enforcement of its judgment by all contracting parties
(id. art. 13).
27. Convention of 31 January 1963 to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on
Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, art. 3, 2 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 685 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Brussels Supplementary Conven-
tion].
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Conventions awaited only the ratification of the signatory na-
tions.8
F. United States (1964-1966)
Popularly known as the Private Ownership Law, the 1964
amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 further weakened
the remnants of the original government monopoly over atomic
energy.9 For the first time in the United States, private persons
were permitted to own special nuclear material.3° The AEC was
authorized to sell its special nuclear material and private owner-
ship was made mandatory by the forced discontinuance of AEC
material leasing after December 31, 1970.3' A government monop-
oly was maintained, however, in the area of uranium enrichment,
since only government-owned gaseous diffusion facilities were al-
lowed to enrich uranium.32
Further changes in the Atomic Energy Act were introduced in
1966 by the "waiver of defense" amendments,33 enacted as a partial
cure for the lack of uniformity among state nuclear liability laws. 4
Through a system of mandatory contractual waivers in the in-
demnity and underlying financial protection agreements, all mem-
bers of the private nuclear industry gave the AEC the power to
compel them to forego any defense based upon fault, governmental
28. France ratified the Paris Convention on March 9, 1966, and the Brussels
Supplementary Convention on March 30, 1966. Germany ratified the Paris Con-
vention on September 30, 1975, and the Brussels Supplementary Convention on
October 1, 1975. 16 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 38-40 (1975).
29. Private Ownership Law Amendment of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-489, 78 Stat.
603 (1964).
30. Id. § 4 repealing 42 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2073(c) (1970).
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2061, 2133, 2134 (1970); Charnoff, Private Ownership of
Special Nuclear Materials in the United States, in 4 LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 97,
114 (J. Weinstein ed. 1966). Thus, while private persons could own uranium in
both its natural and enriched state, they had to temporarily surrender their
natural uranium to the Government who, for a fee, would transform the uranium
into the needed special nuclear fuel. 42 U.S.C. § 2201(v) (1970). This last remnant
of government monopoly was justified on national defense and security grounds.
33. Act of Oct. 13, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-645, 80 Stat. 891 (1966) (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2014, 2139, 2210 (1970)).
34. Since the original Price-Anderson Act had not changed state tort laws
except to impose a limited ceiling on liability, it was possible that one state could
apply a strict liability standard to nuclear accidents, while another state could
apply a negligence theory thus rendering recovery in the latter state much more
difficult. Unequal treatment could also result from different time requirements
under applicable state statutes of limitation.
Summer 1977]
442 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
or charitable immunity, or a statute of limitations in the event of
an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence. '35 Important procedural
provisions to allow consolidation of nuclear liability actions in one
suit were also added.3 0
G. France (1966-1969)
At the international level, France ratified the Paris and Brussels
Supplementary Conventions in March 1966, thus incorporating
them into its own domestic law. The French Atomic Energy Act
(1968)" ' merely completed French nuclear legislation by filling in
those areas of nuclear liability law that the two conventions had
left open to the initiative of the contracting parties.
H. Germany (1975)
Although Germany had signed the Paris and Brussels Supple-
mentary Conventions in the early 1960's, it did not ratify the con-
ventions until 1975, and even then, it made important reservations
to their provisions. 8 Concurrent with ratification, legislation that
significantly changed the German Atomic Energy Act was en-
acted."
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n) (1970). 42 U.S.C. § 2014(j) (1970) states in part:
The term "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" means any event causing a
discharge or dispersal of source, special nuclear, or by-product material
from its intended place of confinement in amounts offsite, or causing radia-
tion levels offsite, which the Commission determined to be substantial, and
which the Commission determines has resulted or will probably result in
substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite. . . . The Com-
mission shall establish criteria in writing setting forth the basis upon which
such determination shall be made.
The AEC Regulations are contained in 10 C.F.R. § § 140.81-.85 (1977).
For a criticism questioning the necessity of a "threshold" requirement to trigger
the waiver of defenses, see Note, The "Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence"
Threshold and Uncompensated Injury Under the Price-Anderson Act, 6 RUT.-
CAM. L.J. 360 (1974).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (1970).
37. Loi No. 68-943 of 30 Oct. 1968, [1969] J.O. 31 Oct. 1968. See P. Strohl,
The Concept of Nuclear Third Party Liability and Its Implementation by Legisla-
tion in OECD Member Countries, in EXPERIENCE AND TRENDS IN NUCLEAR LAW 69-
83 (Int'l Atom. Energy Agency 1972).
38. Laws of January 31, 1975, February 21, 1975, and July 15, 1975, [19751
BGB1 1 957, 992, 1021, 1885.
39. The 1975 German Act made the operator of a nuclear installation exclu-
sively liable. Id. § 25. Also, the previous ceiling on liability was doubled and the
amount of financial security required from nuclear installation operators was
more than quadrupled. Id. § 13. Finally, the system of federal indemnification
[Vol. 10.:433
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I. United States (1975)
Due to expire in 1977, the Price-Anderson Act was revised and
extended on December 31, 1975.40 The new legislation marks a
truly unique withdrawal by the government from subsidization of
private nuclear liability. The Act replaces government indemnity
with a deferred premium system of private insurance.4 By 1985,
at the latest, private insurance is expected to completely cover the
current liability ceiling. After that date, the ceiling on liability will
gradually increase to $1 billion.2 Discussions are being held on
whether the last trace of the American government monopoly in
atomic energy-the enrichment of uranium-should be abolished
as well and transferred to private industry. 3 Also, the constitution-
ality of the limitation on potential nuclear liability is now being
attacked in court. 4
J. Results of Legislative Evolution
Atomic energy law has reached sufficient completeness to permit
systematic review and analysis. The two main areas, property and
tort law, regulate mutual relations between persons and institu-
tions bound either by contract or nuclear incident. While there is
a dominant drift towards private solutions, broader societal inter-
ests and government controls establishing standards for the use
and handling of nuclear materials are still closely bound.
was altered by the establishment of a new arrangement whereby both the federal
and state governments share the indemnification of nuclear liability. Id. § 36. See
International Atomic Energy Agency, 14 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 12 (1975).
40. Government Phase-out Amendment of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-197, 89 Stat.
1111 (1975), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1970).
41. Id. § 3.
42. 121 CONG. REc. S22331 (Daily ed. Dec. 16, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Pastore).
43. Legislation Proposed for Expansion of U.S. Enrichment Capacity
Through the Involvement of Private Enterprise in the Ownership and Operation
of Future Enrichment Facilities: Joint Hearings on S. 2035, H.R. 8401 Before the
Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1975-76).
44. Carolina Environmental Study v. United States, No. C-C-73-159
(W.D.N.C., filed 1973). On December 15, 1975, a bill was also proposed in the
House and Senate to compel a five-year moratorium on the issuance of new
licenses by the AEC. The moratorium period would be used to thoroughly investi-
gate the potential dangers posed by large-scale production of electricity by nu-
clear reactors. H.R. 11159, 19th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. H12597 (Daily
ed. Dec. 15, 1975) (26 sponsors).
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V. NUCLEAR PROPERTY LAW
The three major types of nuclear property are nuclear sub-
stances, nuclear facilities, and nuclear patents. Either by complete
prohibition or strict regulation, the governments of the United
States, Germany, and France have paid particular attention to the
private ownership of these three nuclear property elements.
A. Nuclear Substances
Source material and special nuclear material are the two basic
nuclear substances. In the United States, there is no longer any
prohibition against private ownership of either. Indeed, private
ownership of special nuclear material is mandatory since the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will no longer lease such ma-
terial. Private ownership, however, is subject to strict administra-
tive regulation, 5 and the actual enrichment of natural uranium
can only be done in government facilities."
Under the EURATOM Treaty, to which both France and Ger-
many belong, all special nuclear materials in the member nations
belong to EURATOM. EURATOM also has an option to acquire
ownership of any source material. A cautious interpretation of the
meaning of "EURATOM ownership" is warranted since authority
is granted only to (1) exercise security control over the use of source
materials, (2) demand that such materials be stored in places indi-
cated by and in accordance with the instructions of the Commis-
sion, and (3) forbid the export of source materials when the Com-
mission finds it contrary to Community interest. In all other
respects, a possessor may use and consume such material provided
it does not violate EURATOM's regulations or other obligations.47
EURATOM ownership is also modified by a so-called escape
clause.48
Subject to its EURATOM obligations, France has its own na-
tional legislation on nuclear substances. Any authorized individual
can undertake exploratory work for nuclear source material. 9 Pri-
vate ownership of source materials is allowed, but if the CEA de-
mands the privately owned materials, such material must be
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2073 (1970).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2061 (1970).
47. J. POLACH, EuRAToM: ITS BACKGROUND, ISSUES AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
77 (1964) (emphasis added).
48. EURATOM Treaty, supra note 16, art. 62.
49. D~cret No. 56-838, 16 aolt i956, § 19, [1956] J.O. 8004.
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transferred to the government.-" As a practical matter, the CEA
itself prospects and exploits ore deposits. Until recently, the CEA
and the EDF were the only important purchasers of source materi-
als since they owned all the large nuclear installations.51 Although
special nuclear material is legally owned by the EURATOM Com-
munity, there is no express French prohibition against private eco-
nomic ownership of special nuclear material by private persons
who have been licensed by the CEA. Again, the EDF and CEA
produce and have economic ownership of virtually all special nu-
clear material within France due to their nearly monopolistic dom-
ination of French energy production.
Germany allows private economic ownership of both source and
special nuclear material. The individual states are primarily re-
sponsible for legislation on the mining and possession of source
material. Their legislation is usually modeled after Prussia's Gen-
eral Mining Act of June 24, 1865. Special nuclear material, how-
ever, is primarily dealt with in federal legislation, which itself is
subject to the EURATOM Treaty obligations.52 Under German
federal legislation, possession of special nuclear material without
specific authorization is strictly forbidden, and all special nuclear
material not held by specific private license must be transferred
into governmental custody. While the economic ownership and
title of special nuclear material can be transferred between private
persons, the special nuclear material itself must remain in govern-
ment stores until a new owner can obtain a license to use the
material. "3
B. Installations
After special nuclear material, nuclear reactors are the most
important requisite for the atomic energy industry. Since nuclear
reactor installations pose a potential public hazard of gradual ra-
diation or a sudden accident, the construction, operation, and
transfer of nuclear installations are subject to strict regulation in
all nations.
50. Id. § 81.
51. O.E.C.D. AND ENEA, NUCLEAR LEGISLATION, ANALYTICAL STUDY, REGULA-
TIONS GOVERNING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS AND RADIATION PROTECTION: FRANCE 123,
124 (1972).
52. Laws of January 31, 1975, February 21, 1975, and July 15, 1975, § 5,
[1975] BGB1 1 957, 992, 1021, 1885.
53. O.E.C.D. AND ENEA, NUCLEAR LEGISLATION, ANALYTICAL STUDY, REGULA-
TIONS GOVERNING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS AND RADIATION PROTECTION: GERMANY
179-81 (1972).
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The United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954 made possible the
construction and ownership of nuclear installations by private in-
dustry, but a strict system of permits and regulations was im-
posed. 4 Currently, only uranium enrichment facilities may not be
owned by private industry. 5 In the near future, this last vestige of
the original government monopoly over atomic energy may well be
abolished.
While there is no French prohibition against the private owner-
ship of any type of "basic nuclear installation," the creation of all
such installations is subject to governmental authorization." Since
the French government has a monopoly over electricity produc-
tion, the major commercial use of nuclear reactors is foreclosed to
private industry. The only exception is that a company may oper-
ate a nuclear installation to produce electricity for its own con-
sumption. Therefore, the possibility of private ownership of nu-
clear reactors is illusory for the large part of French private indus-
try that cannot economically afford to maintain a nuclear installa-
tion solely for its own consumption.
Both the German federal (Bund) and state (Ldnder) govern-
ments are empowered to regulate the private ownership and opera-
tion of nuclear installations." There are no absolute prohibitions
on the ownership of nuclear installations by private industry for
either the production or the use of special nuclear material. Unlike
France, which offers aid to private industry despite the predomi-
nant government monopoly over atomic energy, Germany provides
an open field for the private atomic energy industry, free from the
competition of government nuclear installations.
C. Patents
American nuclear inventions with no military applications may
be patented in the normal way,58 although the NRC can declare the
patent to be "affected with the public interest" and then control
by license the use of the patent by others, or compulsorily acquire
it for governmental use. 9 If the NRC chooses to limit or acquire
the patent, a Patent Compensation Board determines the amount
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2133 (1970).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2061 (1970).
56. D~cret No. 63.1228, 11 dec. 1963, § 1, [1963] J.O. 11092.
57. Laws of January 31, 1975, February 21, 1975, and July 15, 1975, § 7(3),
[1175] BGB1 1 957, 992, 1021, 1885.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2181 (1970).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (1970).
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of royalties payable to the holder of the original patent."
EURATOM's role in the patent area is essentially informa-
tional.' Member nations may have individual patent policies, but
they are bound to notify EURATOM of all nuclear patents filed
in their countries.2 If it is interested, the EURATOM Commission
can then work out a patent licensing agreement with the appli-
cant. 3
There is no special French legislation applicable to nuclear pat-
ents, but the CEA Administrator-General can acquire or transfer
any nuclear patent or license. 4 If patents are filed as a result of
CEA efforts, they appear under the agency's name and the inven-
tor sometimes receives a national award." A single private body,
BREVATOME, coordinates and works the nuclear patents of its
members, who comprise a majority of the French public and pri-
vate nuclear industry. BREVATOME is a joint stock company
with variable capital; the CEA contributes 25 percent, the EDF 5
percent, and about 60 private French companies provide the re-
mainder of the capital. Its major concerns are fair valuation of
inventions and avoidance of any abuse by the government monop-
oly. BREVATOME members' nuclear inventions are bought by
the organization, patented in the latter's name, and then distrib-
uted to the members for further development.6 This complete and
voluntary coordination of research efforts by both public and pri-
vate institutions represents a novel response to nuclear invention
problems.
German national legislation contains no specific provisions on
nuclear patents. The general law is codified in the Patents Act of
1936 as amended in 1953 and 1967.67 This basic law empowers the
federal government to exclude from patentability inventions with
military application. The federal government can also require that
an invention be used in the public interest. 8
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2182, 2187 (1970).
61. EURATOM Treaty, supra note 16, arts. 12-23; Note, Patent Policies of the
European Atomic Energy Community, 30 U. Prrr. L. REv. 331, 362 (1968).
62. EURATOM Treaty, supra note 16, art. 16.
63. EURATOM Treaty, supra note 16, arts.14 & 17.
64. D~cret No. 45.3563 of 18 Oct. 1945, § 6, [1945] J.O. 7065.
65. Id. § 9.
66. See LeP~tre, La pratique franqaise en matiere de propri&t6 industrielle
nucl~aire, in 2 ASPECTS DU DRorr DE L'ENGRGIE ATOMIQUE 197 (H. Puget ed. 1967).
67. [1953] BGB1I 615.
68. [1967] BGB1 1 625; KRuSE, supra note 21, at 70-71.
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VI. NUCLEAR TORT LAW
Nuclear liability legislation changes ordinary tort law in five
basic areas: (1) who may be liable for nuclear damage; (2) the
principles under which they may be liable; (3) the extent of liabil-
ity-both in amount and duration; (4) the maintenance of
financial security to guarantee payment of any liability; and (5)
the role of the government in satisfying any liability claims.
A. Parties Liable
The United States, France, and Germany focus liability for nu-
clear accidents on operators of nuclear installations. The legal
techniques they have employed to accomplish this vary signifi-
cantly. Under American law, the determination of who is liable for
a nuclear incident is left to state legislation and case law." There
is no federal provision for the exclusive liability of the operator nor,
indeed, of any other person. The operator, however, must acquire
private insurance70 and enter an agreement with the United States
Government to indemnify all persons who could be held liable for
damage caused by the nuclear property of the operator.7' Although
anyone may be found liable for nuclear damage, the liability will
ultimately be paid under the insurance and indemnity agreements
of the operator. This concentration of liability on one final source
of relief is referred to as "economic channeling.""
In contrast to the United States, both France and Germany,
under the Paris Convention, provide for the exclusive liability of
the operator by "legal channeling. '' 73 With one exception, 74 their
laws do not permit anyone other than the operator of the nuclear
installation to be sued for nuclear damage.
B. Principles of Liability
Determination of the basis of liability for nuclear incidents is
reserved to state law by the Atomic Energy Act of the United
States. Consequently, it is possible for one state to apply a strict
69. Cf. Note, supra note 5.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(a) (1970).
71. Id. § 2210(c).
72. Strohl, supra note 36, at 78.
73. Paris Convention, supra note 25, art. 3.
74. With government approval, a French or German insurance carrier may
substitute its own liability for that. of the operator. Paris Convention, supra note
25, art. 4(d).
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liability standard for nuclear incidents, while another applies a
negligence standard. An attempt to unify the law was made in the
1966 waiver of defense amendments by requiring all licensees to
agree in advance that the NRC may compel them, in the event of
an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence," to waive any defense based
upon fault or any right of recourse they might otherwise have. 5
The waiver system eliminates the necessity of proving the defen-
dant's negligence and, thus, imposes on all states a uniform abso-
lute liability system under which the defendant can only contest
issues of causation and damages. 6
Absolute liability of the operator is one of the basic principles
of the Paris Convention77 and has been incorporated into both the
French and German atomic energy legislation. Upon proof that
th damage was caused by the operator's nuclear property, he
automatically becomes liable for the damage regardless of how
exemplary or blameless his conduct might have been. In France,
the operator is exonerated from all liability if the damage arises
directly out of civil conflict, civil war, or exceptional national dis-
asters that are catastrophic and completely unforeseeable." The
classic exoneration of force majeure, a somewhat lower standard,
is not applicable. 0 Germany made a reservation to the Paris Con-
vention in the area of exoneration, and as a result, the operator is
never exonerated from liability.81 In another reservation to the
Paris Convention, Germany has made an exception to the absolute
liability of the operator if the fault of the injured person or the
person in actual control of damaged property has contributed to
the damage sustained. In such a case, section 254 of the German
Civil Code governs.82
C. Duration of Liability
The United States Atomic Energy Act leaves it to state law to
determine the time within which actions to recover for nuclear
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1).
76. Of course, no waiver system is applicable if the "extraordinary nuclear
occurrence" requirement is not met.
77. Paris Convention, supra note 25, art. 3.
78. See notes 37 & 38 supra.
79. Paris Convention, supra note 25, art. 9.
80. See Strohl, supra note 37, at 73.
81. Laws of January 31, 1975, February 21, 1975, and July 15, 1975, § 25(3),
[1975] BGB1 1 957, 992, 1021, 1885.
82. Id. § 27.
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damages may be brought. In the event of "an extraordinary nu-
clear occurrence," however, the NRC may compel the person in-
demnified to waive any issue or defense based upon a statute of
limitations if the suit is instituted within three years from the date
on which the claimant first knew or reasonably could have known
of his injury or damage and the cause thereof, but in no event more
than twenty years after the date of the nuclear incident.83 Thus,
the Act establishes time limits for individuals both aware and
unaware of their damage.
The Paris Convention's statute of limitation provides that the
right of compensation for nuclear damage shall be extinguished if
an action is not brought within ten years from the date of the
nuclear accident. 4 This absolute limit is further reduced by French
legislation, which provides that claims shall be brought within
three years from the date at which the person suffering damage
knew, or could reasonably be expected to know, of the damage and
the identity of the operator responsible. 5 German nuclear legisla-
tion also fixes a three year time limit for those with knowledge, but
by a reservation to the Paris Convention, it increased the absolute
time limit on the statute of limitation to 30 years.8
D. Liability Limitations, Required Financial Security,
and the Role of the Government
Although United States federal law did not directly purport to
change state tort law, since 1957 it has placed a ceiling on the total
amount of damages that may be recovered by tall parties because
of one nuclear incident. Before 1975 the total amount of liability
was limited to $560 million.87 The 1975 amendment to the Price-
Anderson Act provides for a "floating" limitation of liability
geared to the availability of private insurance.8 It is envisioned
that the limitation of liability will eventually increase to $1 bil-
lion."9 All operators of American nuclear installations are required
83. Government Phase-out Amendment of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-197, § 12, 89
Stat. 1111 (1975), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1)(iii) (1970). The original Act
allowed only ten years as an absolute time limit.
84. Paris Convention, supra note 25, art. 8.
85. Loi No. 68-943 of 30 oct. 1968, § 15, [1968] J.O. 31 oct. 1968.
86. Laws of January 31, 1975, February 21, 1975, and July 15, 1975, § 32(1),
[1975] BGB1 1 957, 992, 1021, 1885.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1970).
88. Government Phase-out Amendment of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-197, § 6, 89
Stat. 1111 (1975), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1970).
89. 121 CONG. REC. S22331 (Daily ed. Dec. 16, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Pastore
[Vol. 10.:433
NUCLEAR LAW
to maintain financial security to cover their own nuclear liability
and the liability of all other persons that might stem from an
accident involving the operator's nuclear property." Currently, the
maximum amount of private insurance available is $125 million,
so the limitation of liability is still $560 million. The $435 million
not covered by direct private insurance is protected by both a
deferred premium plan and governmental indemnity.' Under the
new 1975 system, the financial protection will be established in two
private layers and one public layer, with the public layer being
eventually phased out. The base layer will consist of the traditional
third party liability insurance up to $125 million. The second layer,
to be fixed by the NRC no later than December 31, 1976, will be
made available under an "industry retrospective rating plan" pro-
viding for total or partial deferment of premium charges until the
actual liability from a nuclear accident appears likely to exceed the
base layer."z The maximum amount of the deferred premium shall
not be less than $2 million nor more than $5 million for each
nuclear facility protected,93 and the NRC will continue to provide
indemnity up to the $560 million limit for any damage exceeding
the two private layers of protection. As the secondary layer in-
creases because of a yearly increase in the number of licensed
reactors, however, the governmental indemnity will correspond-
ingly be phased out. When private insurance can cover up to $560
million of liability, governmental indemnity will be completely
phased out, and the limitation of liability will gradually be in-
creased. 4
on the major objectives of the Government Phase-out Amendment).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(a) (1970).
91. Id. § 2210(b)-(c).
92. Id. § 2210(b).
93. The NRC has not yet set the premium figure, but it must do so by Decem-
ber 31, 1976.
94. An example of how this phase-out system will work is provided below:
#1.- estimated 1978 (assume 90 reactors and $2 million deferred
premium)
Third Party Liability Insurance $125 million
Retrospective premiums $180 million
(90 reactors x $2 million prem.)
PRIVATE COVERAGE $305 million
Government indemnity $255 million
TOTAL LIMIT OF LIABILITY $560 million
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The Paris Convention established a maximum liability of $15
million for the operator. This ceiling may be raised or lowered by
national legislation, but in no event can it be less than $5 million.
Any damage in excess of the liability ceiling set by the Paris Con-
vention or the individual nations in accordance with the Paris
Convention shall be paid by the nation in which the nuclear instal-
lation is located up to a maximum amount of $70 million." Finally,
damage in excess of $70 million and up to $120 million shall be
paid by the contracting parties jointly.97 The Paris and Brussels
Supplementary Conventions, therefore, divide liability payments
into three tranches: (1) maximum liability of the operator; (2)
home nation's liability; and (3) collective liability of the contract-
ing parties. Such a system of international payments is quite
unique, for
as far as is known, there is no precedent for a State being obliged to
make available sums of money for the compensation for damage
with which it has no connection. The Supplementary Convention
may, in fact, result in a Contracting Party being obliged to make
available funds under the third "tranche" where the incident occurs
in a foreign country and where the operator liable and all victims
are foreigners."
In France, the maximum liability of the operator is fixed at $10
million for any one incident, regardless of the number of installa-
#2. - estimated 1985 (assume 220 reactors and $2 million deferred
premium)
Third Party Liability Insurance $125 million
Retrospective premiums $440 million
(220 reactors x $2 million prem.)
PRIVATE COVERAGE $565 million
Government indemnity $000
TOTAL LIMIT OF LIABILITY $565 million
(After this point, the limit of liability will continue to grow as the number of
reactors increases and causes a larger pool of retrospective premium coverage.)
For further discussion of the Government Phase-out Act, see Legislative and
Regulatory Activities: United States, 14 NucLEAR L. BULL. 30-32 (1974); Sharpar,
Nuclear Indemnity Legislation in the United States, 15 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 50
(1975); Gehr, The Current Status of Price-Anderson, 10 THF FORUM 1168 (1974).
95. Paris Convention, supra note 25, art. 7(b).
96. Brussels Supplementary Convention, supra note 27, art. 3(b) (ii).
97. Brussels Supplementary Convention, supra note 27, art. 3(b) (iii).
98. Fornasier, The Paris Supplementary Convention, in 4 LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION 23, 29 (J. Weinstein ed. 1966).
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tions he is running on the same site.9 The French Government is
liable for any amount in excess of $10 million up to a maximum of
$70 million. ' Damage in excess of $70 million is covered by contri-
butions from the contracting parties to the Brussels Supplemen-
tary Convention. 10' Therefore, the maximum amount recoverable
from any one nuclear incident is $120 million.
The limit on an operator's liability in Germany was recently
increased from $200 million to $400 million.102 The operator is only
required to furnish financial security of $200 million,0 3 however;
the German Government indemnifies the operator for the remain-
ing $200 million. 0 Interestingly, the government indemnification
is shared by the federal and state governments in a 3:1 ratio.'
Innovative legal principles of nuclear liability benefit all the
parties. For the victim, absolute and exclusive liability of the oper-
ator avoids the problem of having to prove fault in the causation
of the accident and also eliminates the necessity of identifying the
specific person responsible for the accident. Additionally, compul-
sory financial security ensures that some funds for the payment of
nuclear liability will be available, and government indemnity adds
to the potential recovery on nuclear liability claims. If liability
were not focused on the operator, maintenance of nuclear liability
insurance by all potentially liable parties would be too great an
economic burden for ihe private atomic energy industry to shoul-
der, perhaps leading to no system of financial security at all. The
private atomic energy industry has likewise benefitted from nu-
clear liability legislation. The limitations on the amount and time
99. Loi No. 68-943, 30 oct. 1968, § 4, [1968] J.O. 31 oct. 1968.
100. Id. § 5.
101. Id. § 1.
102. Laws of January 31, 1975, February 21, 1975, and July 15, 1975, § 31,
[1975] BGB1 1 957, 992, 1021, 1885.
103. Id. § 13. The new German legislation fails to clarify whether the insur-
ance coverage of the operator extending to $200 million would first be used to
satisfy claims totalling from $70 to $120 million or whether the third tranche of
the Brussels Supplementary Convention would provide the initial payment of
nuclear liability above $70 million. In contrast to the French legislation, the
German legislation did not treat the Brussels Supplementary Convention as part
of its internal law. Rather, it viewed the Convention as only establishing rights
and obligations on the international level so that it did not affect the obligations
of the German government to the nuclear operator or the victim. See Legislative
and Regulatory Activities: Germany, 14 NucLEAR L. BuLL. 14 (1974).
104. Laws of January 31, 1975, February 21, 1975 and July 15, 1975, § 34,
[1975] BGB1 1 957, 992, 1021, 1885.
105. Id. § 36.
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of liability are the counterparts of absolute liability. Exclusive
liability allows the industry to allocate the risk to fewer parties
with a consequent savings in cost. The government, as indemnitor,
acts as another insurer for the nuclear liability of private indus-
try. t06
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Thirty years ago, the first nuclear legislation in the world was
enacted in the United States. Today, the United States, France,
Germany, and many other nations have extensive atomic energy
laws, dealing primarily with property and tort problems. Through
individual experiment and the lessons learned from the experience
of other countries, national nuclear legislation has innovatively
adapted to the Atomic Age. Ownership of the property elements
of nuclear power-nuclear substances, nuclear installations, and
nuclear patents-was of primary importance during the birth of
nuclear legislation. France established a de facto government mo-
nopoly in atomic energy, which has continued to the present day.
BREVATOME, however, represents an interesting practical ap-
proach to public and private industry cooperation in the area of
nuclear patents. The United States originally established a govern-
mental monopoly over atomic energy, forbidding any private in-
dustry involvement. This government monopoly has been grad-
ually eroded and now exists only in the area of uranium enrich-
ment. This last trace of government monopoly may also soon dis-
appear. Germany, a relative latecomer to nuclear legislation, never
created a legal or de facto government monopoly in atomic energy.
The only legislative interference with private ownership of nuclear
property provided that even though one could have economic own-
ership of special nuclear material, one could not possess the mate-
rial without a license from the government.
Legal prohibitions against the private ownership of nuclear
property have generally ceased to exist in the United States,
France, and Germany. Government monopoly has been replaced
by government supervision and regulation, and nuclear legislation
dealing with ownership has gradually disappeared. The increased
private ownership has, however, apparently heightened the need
for special nuclear liability legislation. Thus, nuclear liability is
now the dominant concern of nuclear legislation. The United
States, France, and Germany have all forged detailed nuclear lia-
106. See Strohl, supra note 37.
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bility laws. Carefully shaped to the circumstances surrounding
private ownership of the nuclear power industry, legislation has
produced novel changes in traditional tort law.
Either by "economic channeling" or by "legal channeling," one
person-the operator of a nuclear installation-has been made lia-
ble in the event of a nuclear accident. Absolute liability has been
imposed on the operator by law or by a required "waiver of defen-
ses." Two statutes of limitation have been created-one, an abso-
lute limit; the other, a lesser period for plaintiffs having knowledge
of their damages. Although the amounts vary between nations, the
ceiling on nuclear liability imposed is largely keyed to the availa-
bility of private liability insurance coverage. Financial security has
been made compulsory, and the government has become the in-
demnitor for amounts in excess of private financial security cover-
age. In all these areas, the common law solution is substantially
equivalent to that of the civil law systems.
Presently, the United States is attempting an eventual govern-
mental indemnity phase out by the use of a unique private insur-
ance system of deferred premiums. This will gradually lead to an
increased liability ceiling. In the international sphere, the Paris
Convention tranches system of individual, national, and interna-
tional contributions to nuclear liability represents an experimental
attempt at international sharing of nuclear liability risks.
After a period of incubation and maturation, the world's private
nuclear power industry now appears increasingly able to stand on
its own feet. With the newly found independence of the private
nuclear power industry, the emphasis of nuclear legislation has
shifted from prohibition or sponsorship of private nuclear power
development to public protection. Liability, not government own-
ership, is the primary focus of today's nuclear legislation.
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